

MAT 100 Key Homework # 8

(1)

Lai 460

i. 231

ii. 116 ($4 \text{ voters } 460/4+1$)

iv. $A = 150 \leftarrow A \text{ wins}$

$$B = 50$$

$$C = 120$$

$$D = 140$$

A 1st
B 4th
C 3rd
D 2nd

v. $A = 120 \times 1 + 50 \times 2 + 40 \times 3 + 90 \times 4 + 60 \times 4 + 100 \times 2 = 1140 \leftarrow \text{Third}$

$B = 120 \times 2 + 50 \times 4 + 40 \times 2 + 90 \times 2 + 60 \times 1 + 100 \times 3 = 1060 \leftarrow 4^{\text{th}}$

$C = 120 \times 4 + 50 \times 3 + 40 \times 1 + 90 \times 3 + 60 \times 2 + 100 \times 1 = 1160 \leftarrow 2^{\text{nd}}$

$D = 120 \times 3 + 50 \times 1 + 40 \times 4 + 90 \times 1 + 60 \times 3 + 100 \times 4 = 1240 \leftarrow D \text{ wins}$

vi. $A \vee B$

$$120 + 50 + 100$$

$B \vee C$

$$120 + 90 + 60$$

$A \vee C$

$$120 + 50$$

$B \vee D$

$$120 + 40 + 60 + 100$$

$A \vee D$

$$120 + 40 + 100$$

$C \vee D$

$$120 + 50 + 90$$

A	B	C	D
1	111	11	
4 th	3 rd	1 st	2 nd

C wins

vii. Rnd 1

$$A: 150$$

~~$B: 50$~~

$$C: 120$$

$$D: 140$$

Rnd 2

$$A: 150$$

$$C: 170$$

$$D: 140$$

Rnd 3

$$A: 290$$

$$C: 170$$

A wins

C 2nd B 4th

D 3rd

viii. Yes, independence of irrelevant alternatives & Condorcet

i. 44

b. ii 23

iii. 12 ($44/4+1$)

iv. $A = 18$

$$B = 11$$

$$C = 9$$

$$D = 6$$

A wins

A 1st
B 2nd
< Third
D 4th

(2)

16 cont'd

V. A: $18 \times 4 + 11 \times 1 + 9 \times 1 + 6 \times 1 = 98$

B: $18 \times 2 + 11 \times 4 + 9 \times 3 + 6 \times 2 = 119 \leftarrow \text{wins}$

C: $18 \times 1 + 11 \times 3 + 9 \times 4 + 6 \times 3 = 105$

D: $18 \times 3 + 11 \times 2 + 9 \times 2 + 6 \times 4 = 118$

B 1st
D 2nd
C 3rd
A 4th

VI. A v B B v C
18 18 + 11

A v C B v D
18 18 + 6

A v D C v D
18 18 + 6

A B C D
II I III
4th 2nd 3rd ↑
Darnis

VII. Rnd 1 Rnd 2 Rnd 3

A: 18 A: 18

B: 11 B: 11

C: 9 C: 15

~~D: 6~~

A: 18
C: 26 ← wins
B 3rd
D 4th

VIII. yes, independence of irrelevant alternatives & Condorcet

C. i. 21

ii. 11

iii. 5

iv. N: 5

H: 8 ← wins

B: 3

F: 5

S: 0

V. N: $5 \times 5 + 3 \times 2 + 3 \times 2 + 5 \times 3 + 3 \times 4 + 2 \times 4 = 72$, winner

H: $5 \times 2 + 3 \times 5 + 3 \times 3 + 5 \times 5 + 3 \times 1 + 2 \times 2 = 66$

B: $5 \times 1 + 3 \times 3 + 3 \times 5 + 5 \times 4 + 3 \times 3 + 2 \times 3 = 64$

F: $5 \times 3 + 3 \times 4 + 3 \times 1 + 5 \times 2 + 3 \times 3 + 2 \times 3 = 46$

S: $5 \times 4 + 3 \times 1 + 3 \times 4 + 5 \times 1 + 3 \times 2 + 2 \times 1 = 48$

N 1st
2nd H
3rd B
S 4th
F 5th

(3)

I.E. Cont'd

$$\text{vi} \\ H \vee S \\ 5+3+3$$

$$H \vee B \\ 3+3+2$$

$$H \vee F \\ 5+3+3$$

$$H \vee N$$

$$S+3+2$$

$$S \vee N \\ 5+3+3$$

$$S \vee B \\ 5+3+3$$

$$S \vee F \\ 3+5+3$$

$$N \vee B$$

$$3+3+5$$

$$N \vee F \\ 5+3+5$$

$$B \vee F \\ 5+3+3$$

$$H \quad B \quad F \quad S \quad N \\ 11 \quad 1 \quad 1 \quad 1 \quad 11$$

↑

Fwino
1st2nd tie H, B, N3rd (last) S2nd ~~N~~ & F tied

Vii. Rnd 1

Rnd 2

Rnd 3

$$N: 5$$

$$N: 5$$

$$N: 5$$

$$H: 8$$

$$H: 8$$

$$H: 11 \leftarrow \text{wins}$$

$$B: 3$$

$$\cancel{B: 3}$$

$$F: 5$$

$$F: 5$$

$$F: 5$$

$$F: 5$$

$$S: 0$$

$$S: 0$$

$$S: 0$$

$$\cancel{A: 5}$$

$$B: 4$$

$$B: 4$$

viii. condorcet is violated

2. When they believe their candidate will lose regardless, but they can maybe prevent a less well-liked candidate from winning by voting for a 2nd favorite

3. Answers will vary

#	Votes	6	2	3	
1 st	A	B	C		
2 nd	B	C	D		
3 rd	C	D	B		
4 th	D	A	A		

5. a majority is more than 50% of vote; a plurality is the most votes. These need only be the same when there are only 2 candidates

6. Is there a majority? If there is no majority, there can be no relations.
7. No run-off election is needed (cheaper). ensures someone gets a majority. Less strategic voting
8. Monotonicity requires votes to change (2 elections or a straw poll to compare to is needed) and a candidate needs to get more votes (their position improves) but they end up worse off